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Abstract: Several areas of welfare economics seek to evaluate states of affairs as a 
function of interpersonally comparable individual utilities. The aim is to map each state 
of affairs onto a vector of individual utilities, and then to produce an ordering of these 
vectors that can be represented by a mathematical function assigning a real number to 
each. When this approach is used in intertemporal contexts, a central theoretical question 
concerns the rate of pure time preference, i.e. the evaluative weight to be applied to 
utility coming at different times. This article criticizes the standard philosophical account 
of pure time preference, arguing that it ascribes to economists a methodological 
commitment they need not accept. The article then evaluates three further objections to 
pure time preference, concluding that it might still be defensible under certain 
circumstances. I close by articulating a final argument that, if sound, would constitute a 
decisive objection to pure time preference as it currently figures in much intertemporal 
welfare economics. 
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1. Introduction  
 
 Contrary to the “new welfare economics” of the 1930s and 1940s, which grew out of 
skepticism about interpersonal comparisons of welfare and which still underlies much economic 
policy evaluation, several contemporary areas of welfare economics seek to evaluate states of 
affairs as a function of interpersonally comparable individual utilities. Here the aim is to map 
each state of affairs onto a list (or vector) of individual utilities, and then to produce an ordering 
of these vectors that can be represented by a mathematical function assigning a real number to 
each—“the better the state of affairs, the higher the number awarded to it” (Dasgupta 2001: 20; 
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see also Adler 2012: ch. 2). When this approach (the only approach I’ll consider in this paper) is 
used to evaluate policies having intertemporal effects, a central theoretical question concerns the 
evaluative weight to be applied to utility coming at different times. This question concerns the 
so-called rate of pure time preference, which is one key determinant of the social discount rates 
that can profoundly influence intertemporal evaluation. Often, the rate of pure time preference is 
characterized as the rate at which future utility declines in value “simply because it is in the 
future.” One aim of this article is to explain why that descriptor mischaracterizes pure time 
preference as it features in many intertemporal economic analyses. 
 A second and related aim is to criticize the standard philosophical account of what 
economists are doing when they adopt a positive rate of pure time preference. I will argue that 
the standard account, which traces at least to Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, improperly ascribes to 
economists a methodological commitment they need not, and often do not, accept. At the center 
of my argument is a distinction between two kinds of ranking exercise, which correspond to two 
conceptions of what it means to say that a vector of utilities is better than another. I will argue 
that whereas economists frequently apply pure time preference within one sort of ranking 
exercise, philosophers tend to assume it is applied within a different sort. (I will use “pure time 
preference” as shorthand for “a positive rate of pure time preference”.) I then evaluate three 
further objections to pure time preference, and I suggest that at least one form of it can, under 
certain circumstances, evade these objections. I shall close by articulating, but not defending, a 
final argument against pure time preference that is suggested by the “Social, Economic and 
Ethical Concepts and Methods” chapter of the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) report. If this further argument is sound, it would constitute a decisive objection 
to pure time preference as it currently figures in much intertemporal welfare economics.  
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 A final prefatory remark: It has become customary in this literature to distinguish 
between “prescriptivist” and “descriptivist” approaches to discounting (Arrow et. al. 1996). 
While prescriptivists maintain that discount rates should be chosen on the basis of philosophical 
argument concerning intergenerational ethics, descriptivists tell us to look instead to market 
interest rates and to the preferences and values that individuals reveal in their consumer 
decisions. This debate between prescriptivism and descriptivism is important to resolve, but I 
will not address it here. My aim in this paper is to address the debate over pure time preference 
among those willing to advance “prescriptivist” ethical arguments.1 
 
2. Consumption Discounting, Utility Discounting, and the Ramsey Formula 
 
 When economists employ social discount rates in their intertemporal evaluations of 
public policy, these rates typically discount the value of future consumption. Economists 
measure a person’s or a group’s consumption by totaling the monetary value of all commodities 
consumed.2 Discount rates are then used to express the relative value of consumption tomorrow 
as compared to consumption today. Nowadays, economists and philosophers generally agree that 
there can be reasons to discount the value of future consumption that would not apply when the 
focus is instead on future well-being. Suppose, for instance, that future people will be richer than 
we are today. In that case, an increase in present consumption will produce more well-being than 
would flow from the same (inflation-adjusted) increase in future consumption. This simply 
                                                
1 I address the prescriptivist/descriptivist debate in Kelleher (forthcoming). 
2 Commodities such as environmental amenities that are not bought and sold in a market are ascribed 
“shadow prices” either by asking representative individuals what they would have been willing to pay for 
them, or by inferring willingness to pay from market behavior (e.g. the difference in purchase price 
between homes close to noisy airports and homes free from “noise pollution”). 
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reflects the diminishing marginal utility of consumption, and it does seem to be a good reason to 
treat units of future consumption as less valuable than equivalent units of present consumption. 
But this is not yet any reason to discount the value of the well-being that results from 
consumption. That, after all, is why classical utilitarians—utilitarians in the tradition of Bentham 
and Mill—can remain impartial between the value of any two units of well-being while still 
acknowledging the diminishing marginal utility of consumption (Broome 1994). 
 Economists incorporate the diminishing marginal utility of consumption into their models 
via the parameter η, which figures in their formula for determining the rate at which the value of 
future consumption should be discounted. Yet while economists routinely refer to η as the 
“elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption,” it can and often does reflect more than just 
the declining rate at which individuals convert consumption into personal well-being. For 
example, in the standard “workhorse model” in climate change economics, η “is effectively a 
coefficient of social inequality aversion, in particular to the distribution of consumption across 
individuals” (Dietz et. al. 2009: 377-378). As such, η is often used to reflect moral considerations 
that are at odds with the straightforwardly aggregative framework of classical utilitarianism. To 
illustrate: Partha Dasgupta considers the suggestion that η be set so that the following two 
outcomes are valued equally in economic analyses of climate change: (1) decreasing Adam’s 
$360 of annual consumption by 1%; (2) decreasing Beth's $36,000 of annual consumption by 
50% (Dasgupta 2008: 151-152). For Dasgupta, the question is not whether Adam loses just as 
much well-being from his $3.60 decrease as Beth does from her $18,000 decrease; rather, 
Dasgupta’s focus is on the respective declines among which economists should be indifferent if 
they are to be properly averse to consumption inequality (Dasgupta 2008: 151-152). When that is 
the goal, one uses η to reflect both the rate at which individuals convert personal consumption 
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into personal well-being and the further moral conviction that there is something undesirable 
about interpersonal consumption inequality.3 
 Economists use the following formula to work out the discount rate on future 
consumption, δ: 
 
 δ =   η ⋅ g+ ρ 
 
This is the so-called Ramsey formula, named after Frank Ramsey who first proposed it in a 1928 
paper on optimal national savings rates (Ramsey 1928). In the Ramsey formula, g is the 
estimated annual growth rate in consumption. If g is positive, it means that people in the future 
are expected to be richer than present people and thus expected to enjoy higher consumption. 
When this is the case, a positive value of η will discount future consumption for the reasons to 
do with inequality aversion and diminishing marginal utility.4 That leaves ρ, the annual rate of 
pure time preference. Sometimes the rate of pure time preference is called the “utility discount 
                                                
3 Some theorists invoke prioritarianism to underwrite this further moral conviction. Stern (1977: 241, 242) 
is an early statement of the prioritarian approach, writing that “if we wish to be at all egalitarian,” we 
must evaluate “the contribution of an individual’s income [or consumption] to social welfare by taking a 
concave transform u to arrive at utility and then a concave transform to get to social welfare.” Inserted 
into the workhorse climate economics model, this approach interprets η as expressing the combined 
curvature of these two concave transformation functions. This interpretation of η has been more recently 
articulated by Kaplow and Weisbach (2011). Dasgupta (2001: 181n5, 94) also discusses a prioritarian 
interpretation of η. For some technical problems with employing η as a (partially) prioritarian parameter, 
see Adler and Treich (2015: sec. 3.2). 
4 When g is negative (and ignoring the ρ parameter for the moment), a positive value of η will treat future 
consumption increases as more valuable than present increases of the same size. More on this in Section 
4, below. 
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rate.” This is because of the role that ρ plays in the following mathematical expression, from 
which the Ramsey formula is derived5: 
 
𝑉 =    𝑁! ⋅ 𝑈 𝐶! ⋅    11+ ρ !  !!!!  
 
Here 𝑁! represents the number of people alive at 𝑡. The function U, which is a function of 
consumption at a given time, is routinely called the “utility function,” and it customarily takes 
the following “isoelastic” form: 
 
 𝑈(𝐶!) =    !!!!!!!!  
 
As I have already indicated, when the parameter η is used to reflect both the diminishing 
marginal well-being of individual consumption and social inequality aversion, the U-function 
must be given a different philosophical interpretation from that which it is given under classical 
utilitarianism. For classical utilitarianism has no theoretical room for the sort of interpersonal 
inequality-aversion that economists frequently also use η to express. This is why one must take 
with a grain of salt economists’ use of the term “utility function” for the U-function.6 
                                                
5 I will use the discrete time formulation in this paper. It is only in continuous time that the derived 
Ramsey formula expresses an exact equality. For a proof in discrete time, see Foley et. al. (2013: 92). For 
proofs in both discrete and continuous time, see de La Grandville (2009: 213-218). 
6 Since we have no fool-proof way of measuring the amount of well-being that flows from a given 
increase in consumption, it is possible for classical utilitarians to disagree among themselves about what η 
should be set at. This leaves open the possibility that a certain utilitarian will select a value for η that a 
certain non-utilitarian thinks is (1) too high to reflect the diminishing marginal utility of consumption, but 
is (2) just about right to reflect both the diminishing marginal utility of consumption and the proper 
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Nevertheless, given that economists do call U the “utility function,” I can now explain why ρ, the 
rate of pure time preference, is sometimes called the “utility discount rate.” This will also help to 
explain how the Ramsey formula is related to V. 
 Like U, V is a mathematical function whose role is take arguments (i.e. the inputs to the 
function) and assign a real number to each (this is said to be the value of the V-function for that 
argument). In intertemporal welfare economics, V’s arguments are usually intertemporal 
consumption streams (sometimes called consumption sequences). As an example of a 
consumption stream, consider the vector (C0, C1,…, Ct,…), where Ct is a population’s per capita 
consumption at time t. Obviously, a stream of this sort leaves out information that one might well 
want to know; for example, do the per capita numbers mask intra-population inequalities? The 
real-world answer will almost always be Yes. But to keep already complex matters tractable, I 
will adopt the simplifying assumption, which is standard in many theoretical discussions, that 
intra-temporal consumption is equal. I will also assume that population size is constant across 
time, so that 𝑁! is no longer needed as a term in V; this is again merely to keep things simple. 
 So V takes intertemporal streams of consumption as its arguments, and assigns a real 
number to each stream. To do this, V takes the per capita consumption associated with the first 
time period in a given stream—i.e. C0—and runs it through the U-function. (I will sometimes 
refer to both time periods and the people who occupy them as “generations,” but nothing of 
substance turns on that choice of terminology.) V then multiplies the resulting U-number by the 
first period’s discount factor, the formula for which is given by:    !!!! !   . This is why ρ is also 
called the “utility discount rate”: it is the rate used to generate the discount factor that gets 
                                                                                                                                                       
degree of inequality-aversion. This can leave the utilitarian and the non-utilitarian agreeing on the shape 
of the U-function, despite disagreeing theoretically on η’s conceptual meaning. 
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applied to U-numbers. The discount factor for the first item in the stream, C0, will be equal to 1, 
since    !!!! !    is equal to 1 for any value of ρ. By contrast, the discount factor to be applied to 
the next generation’s U-number will be less than 1 whenever the rate of pure time preference, ρ, 
is positive; in that case, the U-number associated with any future generation will be given less 
weight by V than V would give to that very same number if it were associated with the first 
generation. That is what it means to adopt (a positive rate of) pure time preference. V’s task is 
then to move through the entire consumption stream, first running each generation’s 
consumption-number, Ct, through the U-function, then multiplying each generation’s resulting 
U-number by the generation’s respective discount factor, and then finally adding up all of these 
discount-factor-adjusted numbers. When ρ is positive, the upshot is often called the stream’s 
“discounted sum”; when ρ  = 0, it is sometimes called the stream’s “undiscounted sum.” I shall 
use “discounted sum” as a general term covering both of these possibilities; thus a discounted 
sum is the sum of generational U-numbers after they have all been multiplied by each 
generation’s respective discount factor, whatever those discount factors happen to be. The task is 
then to run all relevant consumption streams through this the same procedure, and to rank the 
streams in order from largest discounted sum to smallest.7 Ramsey in effect showed that it is not 
necessary to first run generational consumption numbers through U and then apply the 
generation’s utility discount factor to each U number. One can instead generate a generation’s 
consumption discount factor,    !!!! !   , where δ, the consumption discount rate, = η ⋅ g+ ρ. One 
                                                
7 I shall not address arguments for pure time preference that stem from the observation that the discounted 
sum of an infinite consumption stream might not converge. Theoretical economists routinely work with 
infinite consumption streams for the simple reason that there is no telling when humanity will come to an 
end. (This accounts for the “∞” symbol in the V-function.) For an overview of these infinity-based 
arguments, see Dasgupta and Heal (1979: ch. 9).  
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arrives at the same discounted sum regardless of whether one runs a stream through V or whether 
one takes Ramsey’s shortcut by applying consumption discount factors to each item in a 
consumption stream and adding up the discounted consumption numbers to yield the stream’s 
discounted sum. 
 As I noted in the introduction, a further common claim made about ρ is that it serves to 
discount a future benefit “simply because it is in the future” (Stern 2007: 161; Quiggin 2009: 
199). Yet in at least some cases this is highly misleading. Consider, for instance, that in his now-
famous report on climate change, Nicholas Stern set ρ to 0.001 to reflect a 10 percent chance that 
humanity would be extinct in 100 years (Stern 2007: 53). Whatever one thinks of this prediction, 
Stern does not discount future consumption using a positive ρ “simply” because it is in the 
future. Rather, he does this because the future happens to contain specific risks that could bring 
humanity’s consumption to a halt. Now, I plan to set aside issues of risk and uncertainty by 
assuming that the current generation can accurately predict what would happen in the future 
under different policies; this enables me to examine the issues related to pure time preference 
that remain when risk and uncertainty are removed from the picture.8 But it is nevertheless 
crucial to my project that we not start from the mistaken assumption that when economists use a 
positive rate of “pure time” preference they are discounting future benefits “simply because they 
are in the future.” If that turns out to be true in any particular case, Stern’s reason for a positive ρ 
shows that it will not be true by definition. We will soon encounter further reasons to reject that 
characterization of ρ.  
                                                
8 It is also common for economists to use η as an index of risk aversion. As I note in the text, I plan to set 
aside the issue of how best to incorporate risk and uncertainty into intertemporal economic analysis. 
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So, if one wishes to rank intertemporal streams of consumption by using the 
mathematical construct V, or by using the consumption discount rate shortcut that Ramsey 
derived from V, should one use a positive rate of pure time preference, ρ? Philosophers routinely 
answer No; economists are more divided. In Section 4, I will answer Maybe. But any answer to 
that question presupposes an answer to a prior and absolutely fundamental question about V that 
is frequently answered in quite different ways by different theorists. I turn now to that issue. 
 
3. Two Approaches to Evaluative Scope  
 
 In this section I aim to show that different parties to the debate over pure time preference 
have quite different ideas about which evaluative considerations properly bear on V-ranking 
exercises. If I am right about this, then at least one common way of characterizing the 
consumption discount rate is formally correct while nevertheless lacking in crucial philosophical 
content. Consider, for example, Nicholas Stern’s definition of the consumption discount rate as 
“simply the proportionate rate of fall of the value of the numeraire [i.e. consumption] used in the 
policy evaluation” (Stern 2010: 50). This means that if the consumption discount rate, δ, is 5%, 
then while conferring an extra marginal unit of consumption to the current generation increases 
the overall value of the V-function by 1, an extra marginal unit of consumption accruing to the 
next generation will increase the value of V by only 0.95; thus as Stern says, δ expresses the rate 
at which the value of consumption—as measured by the effect its presence in the stream has on 
the overall numerical value of the V-function—declines as time progresses. It is this way of 
characterizing δ that is purely formal. For without an answer to the prior question of what sorts 
of considerations are relevant to the V-rankings that welfare economics is concerned with, all 
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that can be said is that the value of a unit of consumption at a given point in time is that unit’s 
contribution to the overall “score” assigned by V to the consumption stream in which that unit 
figures. Since the proper approach to “scoring” consumption streams depends essentially upon 
the evaluative considerations that are relevant to the ranking exercise, the notion of value at work 
in Stern’s formulation is purely mathematical until we settle what I shall call the issue of 
evaluative scope, i.e. the issue of which evaluative/normative/moral considerations do or should 
bear on the V-ranking exercise. The same warning applies to Dasgupta’s definition of the 
consumption discount rate as the “the marginal social rate of indifference between consumption 
in adjacent [time] periods” (Dasgupta 2012: 109). This is again a standard and accurate 
definition of δ, but it too raises the prior question, Social indifference with respect to which 
considerations? The issue of evaluative scope is therefore crucial for interpreting any real-world 
V-ranking exercise. 
 As it happens, there is stark disagreement on V’s evaluative scope within intertemporal 
welfare economics. This has profound consequences for the debate over pure time preference, as 
quite different rates of pure time preference can be defensible depending on which evaluative 
scope is adopted. That in turn means that theorists who disagree on the discount rate can talk past 
one another simply because they implicitly adopt different stances on the issue of V’s evaluative 
scope. Indeed, I think that is frequently the case, especially (but not only) when it comes to 
disagreements between economists and philosophers. One aim of this paper is to substantiate this 
diagnosis. 
Generally speaking, two broad approaches have been taken on the issue of V’s evaluative 
scope, and while each has adherents in the literature, the important differences between them are 
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rarely acknowledged and hardly ever discussed at length.9 As a way into the issue, consider a 
distinction drawn by the working group—Working Group III (WG3)—that was responsible for 
the “Social, Economic, and Ethical Concepts and Methods” chapter of the most recent IPCC 
report (Kolstad et. al. 2014: 215).10 WG3 draws a substantive philosophical distinction between 
justice and value. (I call this distinction “substantive” to indicate that value is here given more 
determinate philosophical content than the exclusively formal/mathematical content it had in 
Stern’s definition of consumption discount rates, as discussed above.) Justice, WG3 claims, 
refers to that domain of ethics concerned with “justice, fairness and rights” (ibid: 215). By 
contrast, value (again in WG3’s substantive sense) is concerned with “improving the world: 
making it a better place” (ibid.). WG3 adopts this distinction from John Broome, one of WG3’s 
lead authors. In his book Climate Matters, Broome uses the famous “Transplant” thought-
experiment to illustrate the distinction between justice and value. Broome explains that while it 
is unjust for a doctor to kill a healthy patient to use his organs to save five others (as this would 
violate his rights), doing this might well promote value—that is, it might well make the world a 
“better” place in the sense that a world with one death and five continued lives is better than a 
world with just one continued life and five deaths (Broome 2012: 51). Elsewhere, Broome 
observes that the UK’s National Health Service will give hospitalized patients an analgesic for a 
headache, even though the money spent on headache treatments will over time be enough to safe 
                                                
9 Notable exceptions include Partha Dasgupta and Amartya Sen, whose views I discuss below. See also 
Robert Dorfman’s reponse to Sen (1982: 355-6), which draws a distinction between “social welfare 
functionals” and “economic welfare functionals” that resembles the two approaches to evaluative scope 
that I shall discuss. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing to my attention two 
unpublished articles that distinguish between the two approaches to what I term evaluative scope. See 
Flanigan (n.d.: 11, 12) (especially his distinction between “pure” and “ambitious” cost-benefit analyses) 
and Greaves (forthcoming: esp. sec. 7.2).  
10 As with all IPCC reports, WG3’s authors are leading experts in their respective fields, in this case ethics 
and economics. 
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a life with an expensive operation. Broome writes, “Evidently, the Health Service thinks that 
curing all those headaches is as valuable as saving a life. I agree” (Broome 2002: 728). The 
notion of value employed here is the same as WG3’s: it allows for the possibility that even if no 
one has a claim to an analgesic, and even if the Health Service’s policy is unfair to the person 
who will die, still the policy is justified because of the degree to which the world is improved by 
preventing all those headaches. In this case (but not in the Transplant case), value considerations 
trump any justice considerations, one might say. 
Hewing closely to Broome’s discussion in Climate Matters, WG3 claims that within 
climate economics, the V-function is used to evaluate consumption streams (and the policies that 
generate them) solely with respect to Broomean value considerations—that is, solely with respect 
to the degree to which the stream “improves the world.” After setting out Broome’s distinction, 
WG3 writes, “Since the methods of economics are concerned with value, they do not take 
account of justice and rights in general” (Kolstad et. al. 2014: 224; see also p. 220 and sec. 
3.4.6).11 Thus, because the consumption discount rate is the marginal social rate of indifference 
between consumption in adjacent periods, WG3’s approach to V’s evaluative scope holds that 
discount rates reflect marginal social indifference with respect to Broomean value considerations 
only. 
 This understanding of V fits nicely with Ramsey’s own seminal treatment. For Ramsey 
presupposed classical utilitarianism, which maintains, first, that the right action or policy is 
always that which maximally improves the world in WG3’s sense, and, second, that individual 
rights and claims—those things that WG3 calls considerations of justice—are not genuine 
                                                
11 WG3 adds that insofar as equality is a matter of distributive justice, economics can indeed take account 
of (that aspect of) distributive justice via inequality-related adjustments akin to those commonly reflected 
in choices of η. See p. 224, and pp. 227-8. 
  14 
fundamental components of ethics. So Ramsey’s V-function certainly was focused exclusively on 
what Broome and WG3 refer to as value considerations. The same goes for at least some 
prioritarians, with the key difference being that prioritarians say well-being’s capacity to 
improve the world diminishes as the beneficiaries of additional well-being have more and more 
of it. For instance, in a recent paper on climate change economics, prioritarians Matthew Adler 
and Nicolas Treich, who refer to V as a social welfare function (SWF), write: 
 
[T]he SWF is a framework for welfarist ethical deliberation. Welfarists see individual 
well-being as the foundation for ethical thought: if two outcomes are identical with 
respect to everyone’s well-being, they are equally ethically good. (Adler and Treich 
2015: 282). 
 
A key difference between Ramsey, on the one hand, and WG3 and Adler and Treich, on the 
other, is that only Ramsey would claim that V-rankings in terms of Broomean value are ipso 
facto rankings of streams’ overall, all-things-considered choiceworthiness. By contrast, WG3 
claims that, “values constitute only one part of ethics,” so that “if an action will increase value 
overall it by no means follows that it should be done” (Kolstad et. al. 2014: 220). This is because 
WG3 holds that there are genuine justice-based considerations that V does not aim to capture. 
And while the welfarism of Adler and Treich is generally hostile to claims about rights, Adler 
and Treich do allow that prioritarian value considerations might be counterbalanced by “quite 
rational” considerations of “prudence,” such that “The recommendations that follow from the 
SWF construct are, in our view, one input into the climate decisionmaker’s rational calculus” 
(Adler and Treich 2015: 285; emphasis in original). These differences notwithstanding, WG3, 
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Adler and Treich, and Ramsey all seem to agree that considerations of rights and justice are 
simply not relevant to V’s ranking exercise; those considerations fall outside of V’s evaluative 
scope, they would say. This makes it likely that these three sets of theorists will all be more or 
less on the same page when they turn to the question of whether V should include a positive rate 
of pure time preference. 
 To be more precise about what these theorists will be “on the same page” about, let us 
call any ranking of consumption streams solely in terms of the streams’ Broomean value a 
goodness ordering. And when an ordering is put forward as a ranking that determines what ought 
to be done all things considered, let us signify this by calling it an ordering*. Thus, sometimes 
goodness orderings are also put forward by theorists as goodness orderings*, and sometimes not. 
For example, while WG3 and Adler and Treich hold that the V-function within climate 
economics is used to generate goodness orderings, we have seen that each gives reasons against 
treating these as orderings*. By contrast, and by virtue of his classical utilitarianism, Ramsey 
used V to generate goodness orderings*. Yet despite this disagreement about whether a goodness 
ordering should in addition be classified as an ordering*, all of these theorists agree that the 
question of whether to adopt pure time preference is the question of whether to do so within the 
context of ranking consumption streams in terms of the goodness they contain.12 
 Consider now a very different conception of V-rankings that leading environmental 
economists Dasgupta and Geoffrey Heal once claimed is “[q]uite possibly the most common 
position that welfare economists have held” (Dasgupta and Heal 1979: 275). It is an 
interpretation that Dasgupta and Heal associate with the economist Tjalling Koopmans. The first 
                                                
12 The fact that some goodness orderings are not intended to be goodness orderings* is a reason to avoid 
treating “at least as good as” and “weakly preferred to” as synonymous phrases. WG3, for example, 
suggests that rankings in terms of goodness will not uniformly line up with defensible social preference 
rankings. 
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feature of the Koopmans-inspired conception—a feature that (contra WG3) Dasgupta and Heal 
imply all V-rankings share—is that V-rankings are essentially rankings that determine what 
ought, all things considered, to be done. To use the signifier I introduced just above, the 
Koopmans-inspired approach conceives of V-rankings as orderings that are also orderings*: 
 
Let Ɔ denote the set of all feasible consumption sequences. The problem that we are 
concerned with is the question of ordering the elements of this set in a manner that is 
ethically defensible. The aim ultimately will be to choose that programme which is 
judged best in terms of this ordering. (Dasgupta and Heal 1979: 258; emphasis added) 
 
It is not surprising that Dasgupta and Heal would tie the Koopmans-inspired approach to the task 
of producing orderings*. For Koopmans helped pioneer “optimal growth theory,” in which “[t]he 
most basic notion is that of a preference ordering of growth paths” (where consumption streams 
are examples of growth paths) (Koopmans 1965: 226; emphasis added). The issue for 
Koopmans, as it was for Ramsey, was to provide a framework to be used in practice for 
determining government investment and spending policy. The term “preference ordering” 
connotes this practical aim, as preferences have clear and tight connections to choice. Indeed, as 
I have defined “ordering*”, it is more or less synonymous with “an ordering that is put forward 
as a social preference ordering”. 
 A second distinguishing feature of the Koopmans-inspired view, according to Dasgupta 
and Heal, is that V is to rank consumption streams on the basis of an “intuitionist conception” of 
ethics (Dasgupta and Heal 1979: sec. 6). As Dasgupta elaborates later in solo-authored work: 
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Rawls (p. 34 [of Rawls 1971]) introduced Intuitionism as “…the doctrine that there is an 
irreducible family of first principles which have to be weighed against one another by 
asking ourselves which balance, in our considered judgment, is the most 
just…Intuitionist theories…have two features: first, they consist of a plurality of first 
principles which may conflict to give contrary directives in particular types of cases; and 
second, they include no explicit method, or priority rules, for weighing these principles 
against one another: we are simply to strike a balance by intuition, by what seems to us 
most nearly right.”…[T]he version of Intuitionism I rely on here is the one that refers to 
the plurality of moral principles, whether or not they are basic. (Dasgupta 2011: 478)  
 
Dasgupta maintains that the Koopmans-inspired conception of V is “particularly attractive” 
because “it leaves open the door for further ethical deliberations” that are foreclosed when the 
task is to construct goodness orderings (Dasgupa 2005: 161). I shall use the term Dasgupta-
Koopmans ordering* to refer to a ranking of consumption streams that (1) is intended to be an 
ordering* (i.e. an ordering that determines what ought to be done) but that (2) is not a goodness 
ordering. (I will refine this definition further in a moment.) 
 Let me give some examples of economists using V to yield what seem to be Dasgupta-
Koopmans orderings*. Take first William Cline, who argues that the decision about the rate of 
pure time preference must be responsive to the moral asymmetry that exists in commonsense 
morality between harming and not-aiding. Cline criticizes Thomas Schelling for likening climate 
change mitigation projects to foreign aid projects. Schelling notes that since rich countries seem 
to discount the distant suffering they could prevent with increased foreign aid, it is not surprising 
that rich countries would also discount the future suffering they could prevent with stricter 
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climate change mitigation policies (Schelling 1995: 397). Cline responds by claiming that even if 
rich countries are right to discount the foreign suffering they could prevent with aid now, there is 
a key ethical difference in the case of climate change. He writes that Schelling makes 
 
…the mistake of equating greenhouse gas mitigation decisions to the bestowal of a 
benefit, whether to Bangladesh today or our own unknown descendants in the future. 
Instead, the issue is the imposition of a damage. Surely there is an ethical difference 
between refraining from conveying a gift, on the one hand, and imposing a damage, on 
the other. Americans might feel no compelling obligation to increase aid to Bangladesh 
today, but surely they would be loath to despoil Bangladesh today (for example, by 
holding nuclear tests close by offshore). (Cline 1998: 100) 
 
In part for this reason, Cline’s economic analysis of climate change was among the first to argue 
for a rate of pure time preference of zero (Cline 1992). As he puts it, “morally there is greater 
responsibility to avoid imposing harm on others than there is to make sure they can enjoy an 
extra benefit at a cheap cost. Call it an intergenerational Hippocratic Oath” (Cline 2012: 7).13  
Now, the distinction between harming and not-aiding does seem to be a consideration 
that WG3 would associate with the ethical category of justice and contrast with the category of 
value. We typically think people have rights against being harmed, and it is this consideration 
that is so starkly illustrated by Broome’s Transplant example. Cline therefore does not seem to 
be interested in what I have called goodness orderings. But does he seek an ordering*? That is 
                                                
13 Cline explicitly invokes this consideration to support “my preferred approach with zero pure time 
preference” (2012: 7). 
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not as clear. True, a good explanation of Cline’s insistence that harm-based considerations be 
reflected in V is that he aims to construct an all-things-considered ranking—an ordering*—in 
which consumption streams are penalized—moved down the list—if they violate Cline’s 
“intergenerational Hippocratic Oath.” Yet for all Cline says, there may be still further moral 
considerations that he wishes to exclude from V’s evaluative scope.14 This interpretive question 
need not detain us, however. The key point right now is that V has been used in intertemporal 
welfare economics to yield something other than goodness orderings. Eventually I will make the 
case that a great many economists do in fact use V to generate what I have called Dasgupta-
Koopmans orderings*. And once we see this as a possibility, it opens the door for the claims I 
shall defend in section 4 concerning the plausibility of pure time preference.   
Here is another example of harm-based considerations entering into a V-ranking exercise 
within climate economics. It involves Dasgupta’s arguments concerning η, rather than ρ. Despite 
questioning the egalitarian and prioritarian rationales that would justify setting η as high as 2 or 3 
in intra-generational economic analyses, Dasgupta argues that intra-generational analyses should 
nevertheless use a value of η in that range. Why? His answer is that while pure differences in 
wealth are not as morally important as egalitarians and prioritarians claim, it does matter how 
those differences arose. And according to him, today’s rich world is not primarily responsible for 
the poverty found in today’s poor world (Dasgupta 2008: 159). By contrast, he writes: “We 
should be anxious over the plight of future generations caused by climate change because we are 
                                                
14 This shows that one can construct a Dasgupta-Koopmans ordering that one does not wish to treat as an 
ordering*. Dasgupta-Koopmans orderings—sans asterisk—are rankings in terms of considerations other 
than (or in addition to) goodness that are not intended by the ranker to reflect the overall-
choiceworthiness of the ranked alternatives. For example, suppose I think there are three fundamental and 
irreducible categories of normative reason: goodness, justice, and fairness. Suppose now that I wish to set 
considerations of fairness aside for the moment and to rank my alternatives solely in terms of goodness 
and justice. In that case, I would be interested in constructing a Dasgupta-Koopmans ordering, but not a 
Dasgupta-Koopmans ordering*, since I do not intend for the ordering to determine what ought to be done.  
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collectively responsible for amplifying that change; the rich world especially so. If future 
generations inherit a hugely damaged Earth, it is we who would be in part responsible” 
(Dasgupta 2008: 159). For this reason, Dasgupta maintains that today’s rich countries have 
stronger obligations to those who will be richer than them in the future than they do to those who 
are poorer than them now, and this is because today’s rich countries have been actively harming 
future people, but not today’s poor. Dasgupta concludes that while today’s rich don’t owe much 
to today’s poor, helping today’s poor may be the best way to help the future people that today’s 
rich have been harming. For example, Dasgupta might recommend helping to improve the 
current economy in today’s poor nations, so that over time the benefits of economic growth can 
be enjoyed by those future people to whom we have strong harm-based obligations. As he puts it, 
a good way to improve “tomorrow’s people in today’s poor world” is simply to improve today’s 
poor world; this is not because we have obligations to “others today,” but rather because we have 
obligations to “tomorrow’s they” (Dasgupta 2012:121). So despite reluctance about intra-
generational egalitarianism and prioritarianism, Dasgupta supports intra-generational 
redistribution on harm-based grounds. This is to be achieved, he says, by using an η between 2 
and 3 in economic analyses of intra-generational policies. 
 Dasgupta’s, Cline’s, and others’ (e.g. Clarkson and Deyes 2002: 15, 52; Davidson 2014: 
sec. 6) harm-based arguments for choosing certain values for the Ramsey formula’s parameters 
are not what one would expect to see if WG3 were right that the V-function in intertemporal 
welfare economics is used exclusively to yield goodness orderings. Yet one might at this point 
ask whether Cline and Dasgupta are simply treating harms, injustices, and rights-violations as 
events whose occurrence makes the world worse than it might otherwise be. That is, perhaps 
they are employing a technique that some philosophers refer to as “consequentializing” 
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traditionally non-consequentialist moral notions. To consequentialize a non-consequentialist 
notion such as rights-violations or injustice is to treat each as yet another “bad thing” that can 
impede world-improvement (Brown 2011). In other words, consequentializers seek to assimilate 
all normatively relevant considerations into the category of value, and this perhaps provides a 
way to say that Dasgupta and Cline are focused on goodness orderings after all. 
A full discussion of consequentializing is well beyond the scope of this paper. 
Fortunately we need not wade into those waters. Instead, I can refine the distinction between 
goodness orderings and Dasgupta-Koopmans orderings* to ensure that, even if Cline and 
Dasgupta are consequentializers, their understanding of the role of the V-function is still 
philosophically distinct from the role that WG3 says it always has in climate economics. Thus, I 
propose to add the following additional features to the distinction between goodness orderings 
and Dasgupta-Koopmans orderings*: (1) a Dasgupta-Koopmans ordering*’s evaluative scope 
essentially includes at least some “agent-relative” considerations; (2) the evaluative scope of a 
goodness ordering essentially excludes all agent-relative considerations. I shall adopt the fairly 
standard account an “agent-relative” consideration given by Larry Alexander and Michael 
Moore:  
 
An agent-relative reason is so-called because it is a reason relative to the agent whose 
reason it is; it need not (although it may) constitute a reason for anyone else. Thus, an 
agent-relative obligation is an obligation for a particular agent to take or refrain from 
taking some action; and because it is agent-relative, the obligation does not necessarily 
give anyone else a reason to support that action. (Alexander and Moore 2012: sec. 2.1). 
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Regardless of whether Cline and Dasgupta view harm-infliction, injustice, and rights-violations 
as just additional “bad things” in the world—that is, regardless of whether they are 
consequentializers—it seems clear that each appeals to agent-relative reasons when they stress 
the reasons we have to avoid inflicting harm on others. For Cline and Dasgupta each grants that 
we may not have strong obligations to poor people whose situation we did not materially 
contribute to; but in addition, each claims that we are not so innocent when it comes to the harm 
that future people will experience from climate change.  
By introducing the notion of an agent-relative consideration, we can bypass the issue of 
consequentializing, for it seems clear that the evaluative scope of both Ramsey’s V-function and 
WG3’s V-function excludes agent-relative considerations. Certainly that was true of Ramsey’s 
classical utilitarianism, which is thoroughly impartial. WG3, for its part, suggests that whenever 
one agent has an agent-relative reason to help another, this will be because the latter has a claim 
on the former to be given what is owed to him, or what he has a right to. And according to WG3, 
what one has a claim to is a matter of justice or fairness, not value. WG3 gives the example of a 
transfer from a rich country to a poor country. When this transfer is made as “an act of 
restitution,” WG3 treats it as a matter of justice; when it is made simply because it will be 
“beneficial to people in the poor country,” WG3 treats it as a matter of world-improvement, a 
matter of value (Kolstad et. al. 2014: 215). This strongly suggests that WG3 would treat agent-
relative reasons as irrelevant to the value-based V-rankings it says climate economics is 
concerned with. So the distinction between impartial considerations and agent-relative 
considerations seems to track WG3’s broad distinction between value and justice. Similarly, 
Dasgupta claims that a central difference between the Ramsey-inspired conception of V and the 
Koopmans-inspired conception is that the former “evaluates social states of affairs by studying 
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the point of view of an Ideal Observer…[who] has no particular point of view,” whereas in the 
Koopmans framework, “The evaluator is the concerned citizen herself” (Dasgupta 2012: 105-6; 
emphasis in original). So regardless of whether it is possible to “consequentialize” agent-relative 
considerations, my refined distinction between goodness orderings and Dasgupta-Koopmans 
orderings* seems sufficient to capture the very different portrait of V-ranking exercises that one 
gets from WG3, on the one hand, and Cline and Dasgupta on the other. Moreover, this 
distinction is all I need to make the points I wish to make in this paper about the rate of pure time 
preference.15 
 Earlier I said that “V takes intertemporal streams of consumption as its arguments, and 
assigns a real number to each stream,” and that might suggest that V is essentially welfarist in 
Amartya Sen’s sense of “making no use of any information about the social states [to be ranked] 
other than that of the personal welfares generated in them” (Sen 1977: 1559). Yet if we are now 
to allow rankings of the Dasgupta-Koopmans variety, V-ranking exercises cannot be exclusively 
welfarist, since agent-relativity can enter only if we allow evaluations that are responsive to non-
welfarist information such as the fact that B has rights that have been or will be violated by A.16 
How, then, should such information enter into the ranking exercise? There has been little 
discussion of this in the literature, beyond some brief and elliptical remarks by Sen and 
Dasgupta. In one discussion of discounting, Sen claims that if V-rankings are to reflect such 
values as the right of future generations to be free of oppression imposed by the present 
generation, then “evaluative weights” such as η and ρ “cannot be made functions only of 
                                                
15 For a defense of pure time preference that explicitly appeals to “agent-relative ethics,” see Beckerman 
and Hepburn (2007). I am indebted to their discussion, but I also think it is hampered by ignoring the 
dialectically crucial issue of V’s evaluative scope. 
16 This is why I have chosen to use the neutral term “V-function,” rather than the literature’s more 
common term “social welfare function.” 
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personal welfare information, and the analysis requires supplementation by nonwelfaristic 
considerations of liberty” (Sen 1982: 347; emphasis in original); “[T]he choice of social rates of 
discount for investments in the development of natural resources (including energy) is certainly 
not independent of these issues [i.e. issues of liberty, rights, claims, entitlement, desert, and 
oppression]” (ibid: 346; see also p. 345). Sen then gives an example that is very similar to 
Dasgupta’s analysis of η: 
 
Suppose the investment project in question will eliminate some pollution that the present 
generation will otherwise impose on the future. Even if the future generation may be 
richer and may enjoy a higher welfare level, and even if its marginal utility from the 
consumption gain is accepted to be less than the marginal welfare loss of the present 
generation, this may still not be accepted to be decisive for rejecting the investment when 
the alternative implies long-term effects of environmental pollution. The avoidance of 
oppression of the future generations has to be given a value of its own…The evaluation 
of investments and the choice of relevant social rates of discount cannot, therefore, be 
reduced simply to considerations involving personal welfare data relating to the present 
and the future. (ibid: 347; emphasis in the original) 
 
As far as I know neither Sen nor anyone else has attempted to construct the “evaluative weight 
functions” that would take as arguments nonwelfarist facts about social states and (perhaps 
together with the welfarist information contained in traditional consumption streams) yield 
values for η and ρ. The tack that seems more likely to be used is Dasgupta’s, in which one 
performs “sensitivity analyses” by varying the discounting parameters to yield an intuitively 
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plausible Dasgupta-Koopmans ordering*. As Dasgupta comments, “Such analyses are thought 
experiments, resembling laboratory tests. They give us a sense of how the interplay of facts and 
values in complicated worlds tells us what we should do. Rawls called the termination of 
iterative processes involving such thought experiments, ‘reflective equilibria’” (Dasgupta 2008: 
157). I shall not pursue the question of whether this approach is fully adequate to the task 
confronting proponents of the Dasgupta-Koopmans framework; I simply want to flag that it is a 
task they must at some point take on. 
 Consider now a further argument for pure time preference that invokes nonwelfarist 
agent-relative considerations. This argument is much more common among economists than are 
the harm-based arguments advanced by Cline and Dasgupta, and it is also the argument that has 
received the most attention by philosophers. Moreover, there is strong reason to believe that any 
economist who makes this argument conceives of V as generating orderings*. Here is Kenneth 
Arrow’s version of the argument (although he attributes the main idea to Koopmans): 
 
[I]magine that an investment opportunity occurs, available only to the first generation. 
For each unit sacrificed by them, a perpetual stream of α per unit time is generated. If 
there were no time preference [i.e. no pure time preference], what would the optimal 
solution be? Each unit sacrificed would yield a finite utility loss to the first generation, 
but to compensate, there would be a gain, however small, to each of an infinity of 
generations. Thus, any sacrifice by the first generation is good. Strictly speaking, we 
cannot say that the first generation should sacrifice everything, if marginal utility 
approaches infinity as consumption approaches zero. But, we can say that given any 
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investment, short of the entire income, a still greater investment would be preferred. 
(Arrow 1999: 14, emphasis in the original) 
  
In response, Arrow says:  
 
I find this to be an incredible and unacceptable strain on the present generation...I 
therefore conclude that the strong ethical requirement that all generations be treated alike, 
itself reasonable, contradicts a very strong intuition that it is not morally acceptable to 
demand excessively high savings rates of any one generation, or even of every 
generation. (Arrow 1999: 16)17 
 
Arrow concludes that we must acknowledge “a principle of self-regard, of the individual as an 
end and not merely a means to the welfare of others,” which in turn grants each generation the 
moral right to “maximize a weighted sum of its own utility and the sum of utility of all future 
generations, with less weight on the latter” (Arrow 1999: 16; see also Beckerman and Hepburn 
2007). The “weighted sum” here is a clear reference to a V-function that involves a positive rate 
of pure time preference. Elsewhere, after setting out the same argument, Arrow says, “Very 
tentatively, it would seem that the rate of pure time preference should be about 1% [i.e. ρ = .01]” 
(Arrow 1995: 17).  
                                                
17 Arrow’s argument invokes as a key premise what Broome (1994: 139) calls the “fertility of 
technology,” or the claim that “commodities in general this year can be converted into a greater quantity 
of commodities next year” through productive investment. The phenomenon is connected to another 
common argument for discounting that claims discounting at market interest rates (or at some average of 
them) is needed to take proper account of the opportunity costs of capital. Nordhaus (2007) advances this 
argument in opposition to Stern’s low rate of pure time preference. Nordhaus’s argument is criticized in 
Foley et. al. (2013: 95-96). An alternative method of accounting for opportunity costs, one that divorces it 
from the issue of discounting, is set out in Dasgupta et. al. (1972: ch. 14); see also Lind (1982).  
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It seems plain that Arrow is concerned to construct a Dasgupta-Koopmans ordering*; not 
only is his principle of self-regard quintessentially agent-relative, but he also appears to conceive 
of V-rankings as rankings of consumption streams in terms of their overall choiceworthiness. If 
he did not, he would have no pressing need to use pure time preference to ensure that 
consumption streams involving very low current consumption are ranked lower than streams 
with higher current consumption. And given the popularity that this particular “argument from 
excessive sacrifice” has in the literature, it would seem that Dasgupta and Heal were correct to 
say that it is not uncommon for intergenerational welfare economists to conceive of V-rankings 
in this way. In a more recent example, William Nordhaus invokes Koopmans and agent-relativity 
to illustrate the “heavy burden of very low discounting.” Nordhaus writes: 
 
How might we think about our obligations to our children, grandchildren, and so on 
further down the generational line? I will use the example of parental concerns to 
illustrate the point. As parents, we naturally feel intense concern for our children…We 
also care deeply for our grandchildren, but our anxieties are mediated by the knowledge 
that their parents—our children—are also caring for them. Similarly, our great-
grandchildren and great-great-grandchildren are more remote from our anxieties. In a 
sense, they have an “anxiety discount” because we cannot judge the circumstances in 
which they will live, and because our children and grandchildren will be there to care for 
them after we are gone….Now take the example of zero discounting, which is sometimes 
advocated by philosophers…[S]uppose that we have no anxiety discounting for future 
generations, so that we are just as anxious about our grandchildren as about our 
children…In this situation, most of us would dissolve into a sea of anxiety…We would 
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simply be unable to decide what to do. Zero discounting is like an infinitely heavy load 
on our shoulders. This argument sounds like a bit of flaky pseudo-mathematics, but it is 
exactly the nub of the deep mathematical analysis of zero discounting made by Nobel 
Prize-winning economist Tjalling Koopmans. (Nordhaus 2013: 192-193) 
 
Here too, Nordhaus appears to view V-rankings as orderings*; why else would “zero 
discounting” entail a heavy load on our shoulders? He also agrees with Arrow that it is 
reasonable to tailor discount rates to protect oneself and one’s generation from drowning in a sea 
of concern for the well-being of those to whom one is not closely related. Nordhaus’s analogy 
with parental concern thus strongly implicates agent-relative considerations, and suggests that 
he, like Arrow, is interested in producing Dasgupta-Koopmans orderings*, rather than mere 
goodness orderings. 
 And yet ever since Rawls, many philosophers simply assume without argument that the 
economist’s V-function is essentially tool for generating goodness orderings. Consider, for 
instance, Rawls’s own response to the “excessive sacrifice argument” for pure time preference 
that Arrow, Nordhaus, and many others find so compelling. Rawls claims that by adopting a 
positive rate of pure time preference within a V-function, economists are applying an “ad hoc” 
adjustment to “the utilitarian principle” (Rawls 1999: 262). As I interpret this line of criticism, 
Rawls assumes that economists set out to construct a classical utilitarian goodness ordering*, and 
then, upon not liking utilitarianism’s practical implications, they seek to diminish the degree to 
which future well-being improves the world by adopting pure time preference. Rawls criticizes 
this as a theoretical move that has “no intrinsic ethical appeal” and that “simply mitigates the 
consequences of mistaken principles” (ibid.).  
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But in light of the Koopmans-inspired conception of V-ranking exercises, Rawls’s line of 
criticism against pure time preference attributes to economists a methodological commitment 
they need not, and often do not, endorse. For Dasgupta-Koopmans orderings* have no essential 
connection to classical utilitarianism. Dasgupta, recall, claims that the main virtue of the 
Koopmans-inspired approach is its ability to reflect a plurality of ethical considerations. He adds:  
 
Ramsey’s ethics was overtly Utilitarian. Nearly five decades of work by economists 
working on the ethics of the long run has shown that ethics will not do. It has shown that, 
agreeably, there is a compelling theory that has the same mathematical structure as the 
one invented by Ramsey. So, although Ramsey’s ethics cannot be accepted, the 
techniques he devised for evaluating the just rate of saving can be adapted for use in 
worlds that are ethically far richer than the one he considered. (Dasgupta 2005: 169) 
 
It seems not to have occurred to Rawls to conceive of the V-function in this way (or if it did, he 
mistakenly decided it was not a conception worth engaging with). 
 The broad objection that Rawls pressed against pure time preference is by far the most 
common objection in the philosophical literature. For example, Simon Caney notes that Arrow 
explicitly invokes Samuel Scheffler’s idea of an “agent-centered prerogative,” which is an 
example of what I have termed an agent-relative consideration that confers upon individuals the 
moral right to a certain degree of freedom to pursue their own goals and interests (Scheffler 
1994). While Caney thinks Scheffler’s idea is “very plausible” (Caney 2008: 550), he also thinks 
Arrow misunderstands it: 
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The whole point of [Scheffler’s] argument is that persons do not have a duty to maximize 
well-being. That is why his book is called The Rejection of Consequentialism. To invoke 
agent-centered prerogatives whilst also affirming a maximizing consequentialism thus 
misunderstands Scheffler’s argument and the conclusions that he plausibly derives from 
it. (ibid.)  
 
Like Rawls, Caney seems to think that Arrow starts from, and dearly wishes to stick to, a 
mistaken conception of ethics that is committed to maximizing goodness. Yet now that we 
posses the concept of a Dasgupta-Koopmans ordering*, we must ask why one should think that 
the conception of ethics underlying Arrow’s argument is appreciably different from the non-
consequentialist Schefflerian one that Caney himself finds attractive.18 On my reading of Arrow, 
his suggestion that each generation “maximize a weighted sum of its own utility and the sum of 
utility of all future generations, with less weight on the latter” is simply the claim that the current 
generation is morally entitled to prefer consumption streams that are gentler on it than a 
goodness ordering* would be. I find no basis to infer, for example, that Arrow takes future well-
being to improve the world at a slower rate than present well-being.19 Indeed, Arrow explicitly 
endorses an obligation to “treat everyone else equally” (Arrow 1999: 16). His seems to be the 
                                                
18 In a later paper, Caney claims without much argument that Schefflerian prerogatives should not 
influence the V-function because prerogatives are morally irrelevant “from the point of view of humanity 
at large” (Caney 2014: 335).  
19 To use the categories employed in Caney (2014), I take Arrow to be giving what Caney terms 
“Response (b)”—i.e. Arrow Modifies the distributive principle. Arrow does this by modifying the rate of 
pure time preference in the V-function (which is Caney’s “Response (a)”). Caney does not seem to see 
that, at least within a V-function intended to generate Dasgupta-Koopmans orderings*, giving Response 
(a) can be the economist’s way of giving Response (b). Caney mistakenly thinks that to modify the rate of 
pure time preference is perforce to accord unequal moral status to future generations. Put once more in 
terms of Caney’s categories, he mistakenly thinks that rate of pure time preference amounts to tweaking 
Caney’s Variable 2, when in fact it is often used by economists solely to tweak Variable 3. See Caney 
(2014: 322, 326). 
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pluralist view that equal-treatment and self-concern is each a genuine component of 
intergenerational ethics. Again as he puts it, “One can only say that both the universal other and 
the self impose obligations on an agent” (Arrow 1999: 16; emphasis in the original). This 
strongly suggests that Arrow is doing exactly what Caney wants him to do, viz. adopting 
something very much like Scheffler’s view. I believe that is exactly what Arrow seeks to do 
when he seeks to build both “impersonally moral obligation” and agent-relative moral 
convictions into his V-function (ibid.).  
 Many other philosophers appear to offer the same analysis of pure time preference as 
Rawls and Caney. Responding to the economist’s claim that a pure discount rate of zero would 
be too onerous on the current generation, Dominic Roser replies that, “the whole underlying 
theory of utilitarianism is to be rejected and not simply the discount rate of zero within 
utilitarianism” (Roser 2009: 15; emphasis added). Darrel Moellendorf says that adopting a 
positive pure discount rate within a framework having “utilitarian origins” amounts to “a bad fix 
to a rotten theory” (Moellendorf 2004: 105, 116). And Tyler Cowen and Derek Parfit write:  
 
If we aim for the greatest net sum of benefits over time, this may require a very unequal 
distribution between different generations. We may wish to deny that there ought to be 
such inequality. And we can avoid this conclusion, in some cases, if we discount later 
benefits. But, as Rawls points out, this is the wrong way to avoid this conclusion. If we 
believe that such inequality would be unjust, we should not simply aim for the greatest 
net sum of benefits. We should have a second moral aim: that these benefits be fairly 
shared between different generations. To our principle of utility we should add a principle 
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about fair distribution. This more accurately states our real view. And it removes our 
reason for discounting later benefits. (Cowen and Parfit 1992: 149)  
 
Each of these remarks suggests that pure time preference is the economist’s way of holding onto 
the goodness-maximizing “principle of utility” while still accommodating ostensibly non-
utilitarian ideas. They characterize discounting as an operation that dilutes a policy’s capacity to 
produce goodness, so that the policy becomes less attractive from a classical utilitarian point of 
view. And they suggest that the proper way to respect non-utilitarian ideals is not to embrace 
pure time preference, but rather to admit that the principle of utility is not the only fundamental 
moral principle. 
I have argued that this standard philosophical account of what pure time preference 
within a V-function essentially consists in is mistaken. As I have shown, Cline and Dasgupta use 
consumption discount rates in part to reflect a traditionally non-consequentialist distinction 
between harming and not-aiding, while Arrow uses a positive rate of pure time preference to 
reflect Scheffler’s non-consequentialist commitment to agent-centered prerogatives. I see no 
reason for characterizing the theoretical choices Cline, Dasgupta, and Arrow make concerning 
the parameters η and ρ as “adjustments to the utilitarian principle,” rather than simply attempts 
to construct a mathematical function that can represent a plausible non-utilitarian ordering*. 
Dasgupta summarizes the situation nicely: “[B]ecause [the V-function] has the appearance of 
discounted utilitarianism, it’s easy to be misled into thinking that Koopmans’ theory is only a 
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vulgar form of Classical Utilitarianism” (Dasgupta 2012: 106). I believe this is exactly the trap 
that philosophers frequently fall into.20  
 My goal in this section has been to articulate what economists are not committed to 
simply by virtue of using a V-function to rank consumption streams. They are not committed to 
classical utilitarianism or any cousin thereof; nor are they committed to focusing only on what I 
have called goodness orderings. But precisely because this fact is missed by many, it is possible 
that at least some of the real-world debate over pure time preference amounts to talking at cross-
purposes. Consider, for example, that in Nicholas Stern’s report on the economics of climate 
change, Stern claims that he will employ “the ethical framework of standard welfare economics,” 
which “looks first only at the consequences of actions…[and] has no room, for example, for 
ethical dimensions concerning the process by which outcomes are reached.” He adds: “Some 
different notions of ethics, including those based on concepts of rights, justice and freedoms, do 
consider process” (Stern 2007: 32). This account of the “standard” ethical framework underlying 
intertemporal welfare economics contrasts sharply with the frameworks that Cline, Dasgupta, 
Sen, and Arrow appear to operate within. I am not in a position to speculate how this came to be. 
But given that it is so, there is some reason to think that Stern’s stance on the evaluative scope of 
the V-function is partly responsible for the heated controversy his report caused by employing a 
very low rate of pure time preference. If Stern thinks that intertemporal welfare economics is 
exclusively concerned with goodness orderings, then it is possible that he and his critics are not 
                                                
20 I will say, however, that it also impedes dialectical understanding when Dasgupta refers to V as the 
“intergenerational well-being” function. See, e.g., Dasgupta (2001: ch. 6), Dasgupta (2005: 159), 
Dasgupta (2008: sec. 3), and Dasgupta (2012: 103). In my view, Dasgupta’s use of this phrase should be 
taken with the same grain of salt as we should take when economists refer to the U-function as a “utility 
function”. We should not let mere terminology dictate our philosophical analysis of V. 
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really disagreeing.21 For as I will stress in the next section, it is not inconsistent to reject pure 
time preference within a V-function designed to yield a goodness ordering while simultaneously 
embracing pure time preference within a distinct V-function designed to provide a Dasgupta-
Koopmans ordering*. 
 
4. Evaluating Pure Time Preference  
 
 I have drawn a distinction between economic analyses that use V-functions to generate 
goodness orderings and analyses that use them to generate Dasgupta-Koopmans orderings*. Let 
us distinguish further between a consumption stream’s DK value, which reflects its ranking in a 
Dasgupta-Koopmans ordering*, and its Goodness value, which reflects its place in a goodness 
ordering. Derivatively, conceive of the DK value and Goodness value of a given time-stamped 
increment of consumption as the degree to which its presence in a consumption stream increases, 
relative to the status quo, the score assigned by a given Dasgupta-Koopmans V-function and a 
given goodness-focused V-function, respectively.  
A crucial point emerges once these two notions of value are distinguished. For it is now 
conceptually possible to defend pure time preference when evaluating consumption’s DK value 
while rejecting it when evaluating consumption’s Goodness value. To illustrate: in the 
Transplant case, the policy of killing the one healthy person to save the five sick people carries 
the most Goodness value, since there is no compelling reason to discount the Goodness value of 
any of the six lives at issue. But if it is all-things-considered wrong to kill one to save the five, 
                                                
21 Recall that I am restricting myself in this paper to debates between prescriptivist critics. There are many 
descriptivist critics of Stern, and I do not intend my remarks here to apply his debates with them. I 
address that debate in Kelleher (forthcoming). 
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then the doctor should treat the policy of killing one patient as having less DK value than the 
policy that involves letting five die. Thus a Dasgupta-Koopmans V-function that seeks to 
represent a plausible Dasgupta-Koopmans ordering* will, in this case, discount the DK value of 
the well-being that would be produced by killing. While this is not an instance of “discounting 
for time,” it does illustrate the crucial point, which is that there can be good reasons to discount a 
benefit’s DK value even if there are no good reasons to discount its Goodness value. And now 
that it is possible for these to come apart, we can see that philosophical objections to discounting 
the one do not immediately constitute objections to discounting the other. 
 From this point on, I will assume that it is indeed improper to adopt pure time preference 
when evaluating consumption streams’ Goodness value. For it is in the context of goodness 
orderings that pure time preference wrongly degrades the moral status of future people by 
implying that their consumption is, merely by virtue of their placement in time, less able to 
improve the world. It is here that the common complaint about “discrimination by date of birth” 
has its grip.22 But if we now agree that it is wrong to apply pure time preference to future 
consumption’s Goodness value, what should we say about pure time preference in the context of 
future consumption’s DK value? Or as I shall put the question, how should we think of pure DK 
discounting? 
Before I can answer that question, I must introduce a further distinction of John 
Broome’s. Pure time preference, Broome says, can be adopted in either a temporally neutral or a 
                                                
22 See, for example, Caney (2014: 324): “[S]omeone’s temporal location seems on a par with their racial 
identity or gender or ethnicity; and in the same way that it is wrong to penalize or discriminate against 
someone because of their race or gender so it is also wrong to discriminate against someone because of 
their date of birth. It is not the right kind of property to confer on people extra or reduced moral status.”; 
and Gollier and Hammitt (2014: 278): “A nonzero value of [the rate of pure time preference] penalizes 
people on the basis of their birth date, which is as ethically unacceptable as racism (penalty based on the 
color of the skin) and sexism (penalty based on gender).” 
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temporally relative way. Temporal neutrality is the view that value “does not depend on a 
temporal perspective,” whereas temporal relativity holds that value “depends on the perspective 
of the particular time when it is evaluated” (Broome 2012: 149). Each of these positions allows 
for pure time preference. Temporal relativity, for example, allows for pure time preference to be 
applied both forwards and backwards from whatever time the evaluation is being done. Such a 
view tilts in favor of the generation doing the evaluation, for it tends to engineer orderings whose 
top-ranked consumption streams are friendly to the consumption of the evaluating generation. To 
see that temporal neutrality also allows for pure time preference, note that one can convert a 
temporally relative V-function into a temporally neutral V-function simply by fixing the 
privileged year in time.23 For example, if we fix 2016 as the privileged year, then although 
consumption in 2015 and 2017 will each have a rate of pure time preference applied to it, this 
will be so regardless of whether the evaluation is done in 2016 or 3500 or 1500 BCE. And that is 
enough to make the V-function temporally neutral. (It is, of course, not a very plausible way to 
adopt temporal neutrality.) 
 With this distinction between temporal neutrality and temporal relativity in hand, let us 
consider the plausibility of (1) temporally neutral pure DK discounting and (2) temporally 
relative pure DK discounting. (Since I have granted it is a moral mistake to apply pure time 
preference in the context of consumption’s Goodness value, I shall have nothing more to say 
about it.) 
It might at first seem incoherent to speak of temporally neutral pure DK discounting, 
given that I have built agent-relativity into the very concept of a Dasgupta-Koopmans ordering*. 
                                                
23 Broome (2004: 70) discusses another way to embrace temporal neutrality within a non-impartial V-
function. 
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But we might be able to make sense of it. Consider a V-function that applies “exponential” pure 
time preference throughout all history. (“Exponential” means that the rate of pure time 
preference is constant.) Thus, regardless of the evaluator’s location in time (and setting aside 
inequality aversion), a unit of consumption in 1504 will be worth more than a unit of 
consumption in 1505, and a unit of consumption in 2049 will be worth more than a unit of 
consumption in 2050. Because it privileges no temporal vantage point, this V-function is 
temporally neutral. Still, it is possible for it to reflect agent-relative considerations, as well. To 
see this, consider Broome’s response to Rawls’s claim that the parties in his Original Position 
“will not consent to a [pure discounting] principle that weighs nearer periods more or less 
heavily” (Rawls 1999: 260). Broome replies that “exponential discounting treats each generation 
less favorably relative to its predecessors. But in compensation, it treats each more favorably 
relative to its successors. And it has the advantage, compared with an impartial principle, of 
putting less strain on each generation’s self control” (Broome 1992: 97-98). He concludes that 
the parties to Rawls’s Original Position might well agree that exponential discounting adequately 
promotes their self-interest. Since concern for self is clearly an agent-relative concern, Broome’s 
response to Rawls illustrates one way to adopt a temporally neutral V-function that still reflects 
agent-relative considerations. 
But is this combination of temporal neutrality and pure DK discounting plausible? In his 
writings on discounting, Broome, like the other philosophers I’ve cited, interprets economists as 
focused on Goodness value. For example, after Broome himself carefully distinguishes between 
considerations of goodness and considerations of justice and rights, he says without argument 
that when economists express views on discounting, they are expressing “judgments about 
goodness” (Broome 2012: 150; see also Broome 2008). Yet Broome at one point offers an 
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objection to pure time preference that differs from the moral status-related objection that I have 
agreed is a problem when pure time preference is applied to consumption’s Goodness value. And 
Broome’s different objection can also be lodged against temporally neutral pure DK discounting: 
 
[This view] requires later wellbeing to count for less than earlier wellbeing, whatever 
date it is regarded from. Wellbeing in 2010 counts for a fraction of wellbeing in 1910, 
say, and that is so from the perspective of 1920, 2010 or any other date. So major 
sacrifices would be worthwhile in 2010 if they could bring small benefits in 1910. This 
seems implausible. It is hard to test its plausibility, because it is hard to see how sacrifices 
made in 2010 could possibly bring benefits in 1910. But we can invent a thought 
experiment. Some people think it is good for a person to be famous after her 
death…Whatever you think of this idea, imagine for a moment it is correct. Then it 
would be possible to benefit Thomas Hardy by propagating his fame in 2010. And if 
wellbeing in 1910 is worth so much more than wellbeing in 2010, it would be worth great 
sacrifices on our part in 2010 to propagate Hardy's fame. It would be much more valuable 
than propagating the fame of a contemporary author. This is hard to believe. (Broome 
2004: 71) 
 
Because Broome speaks of what could justify making great sacrifices in practice, his objection 
can be pressed against a Dasgupta-Koopmans V-function that gives consumption in the distant 
past much greater DK value than equivalent amounts of present consumption. And when pressed 
in that context, the objection does seem rather compelling—at least if we are willing to play 
along with Broome’s fanciful example. Should we be willing? I’ll return to this in a moment. 
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 Suppose for now that Broome’s thought-experiment does reveal the implausibility of 
temporally neutral pure DK discounting. What about temporally relative pure DK discounting? 
Broome formulates a worry having to do with “reversals of value” (Broome 2004: 75; Broome 
2012: 150-152) that can again be lodged against this kind of discounting, as it is a worry that is 
especially relevant when the task is that of placing one’s options into an ordering*: 
 
Suppose you now have a choice between two options A and B. If A is better than B 
relative to the present time, then [temporal-relativity] says you ought to choose A. 
Suppose you do as you ought and choose A. But suppose that relative to some later time, 
B is better than A. Then at the later time you ought not to have chosen A. You choose 
rightly, but it later turns out you chose wrongly. Indeed, it may turn out that you ought 
later to undo what you rightly did. Moreover, you might be able to foresee even as you 
choose A that just this would happen. This is a most implausible sort of incoherence in 
your activity. (Broome 2004: 75) 
 
Now, while I do not agree with Broome that Arrow is focused on goodness, Broome is on firmer 
ground when he says that Arrow discounts in a temporally relative way. As Broome puts it, 
“Being a practical man, [Arrow] does not consider past well-being, but we can assume that he 
would not assign enormous value to past events in the way that [temporally-] neutral discounting 
implies” (Broome 2012: 150). This, at any rate, is the interpretation supported by Arrow’s appeal 
to an agent-relative principle of self-regard. So let us ask: is the prospect of value-reversals a 
fatal problem for the sort pure DK discounting that Arrow seems to endorse? Arrow actually 
suggests not. His view appears to be that even if the morality of Schefflerian prerogatives 
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initially recommends temporally relative pure DK discounting to each generation, a game-
theoretic analysis of decision-making by successive generations will commend to each 
generation policies that mimic temporally neutral DK discounting (Arrow 1999: 17). I do not 
have the space to evaluate Arrow’s argument here. I will simply note that, so far, the only 
objection to it that we’ve encountered is Broome’s “Thomas Hardy” objection. Is that enough to 
sink Arrow’s view? I am not prepared to say it is. After all, the Hardy objection applies only if it 
is possible to benefit dead people to a significant degree.24 Yet if it is reasonable to ignore the 
possibility of posthumous benefits, and if Arrow’s game-theoretic account of the practical upshot 
of agent-relative considerations is sound, then Arrow’s view may offer a tolerable way to respect 
Schefflerian prerogatives while avoiding value reversals in practice. 
 Broome, though, has a third and final objection. He argues that even if agent-relative 
considerations do support the discounting of DK value, that is still no reason to embrace pure 
DK discounting. Instead, Broome suggests, prioritarianism can capture whatever is reasonable 
about prerogatives, and prioritarianism is expressed by adjusting η, not ρ. He writes: 
 
What attraction does [pure time preference] have, anyway? Most of the arguments that 
have been presented in its favor are versions of this one: [classical] utilitarianism, which 
does not allow discounting, has implications that seem too demanding. It implies that we 
should be saving and investing much more for the future than seems plausible...Pure 
discounting at a fast enough rate is another way to evaporate the problem. But it does not 
                                                
24 And only then if benefits are “time-stamped” such that the benefit our action bestows upon Hardy 
accrues to him in the past. (I owe this point to David Morrow.) Broome is clearly assuming that 
posthumous benefits are time-stamped in this way. 
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attack the problem's intuitive source, which is that we should not be asked to make a big 
sacrifice for better-off people. Pure discounting is an ad hoc fix. (Broome 2012: 152-3) 
 
Broome thinks the source of the problem of intergenerational demandingness is the conviction 
that we should not be asked “to make such a big sacrifice for future generations even if those 
generations will be better off than us” (Broome 2012: 152). If he were right about that, then the 
problem could indeed be addressed by increasing η in the V-function, because that’s how one 
dilutes the DK value of consumption that would accrue to better off people. But is Broome 
correct that prioritarianism fully addresses the problem of intergenerational demandingness? 
Consider a world without human-caused climate change in which an avoidable natural disaster 
(e.g. a preventable volcanic eruption) is expected in 2200.25 Suppose everyone in the current 
generation enjoys the same level of consumption enjoyed by the average American today. Now 
suppose the current generation must choose between the following two options:  
 
Business As Usual, in which everyone living until 2200 enjoys the current generation’s 
level of consumption and all people living after 2200 enjoy the consumption-level of the 
average American in 1980. 
 
Prevention, in which the current generation sacrifices to prevent the volcanic eruption, 
thereby reducing their consumption to that of the Average American in 1985; as a result, 
all future people enjoy the consumption-level of the average American in 1985. 
 
                                                
25 Here I adapt an example given in another context by Woollard (2012). 
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I suspect many will take the view that members of the current generation may exercise 
Schefflerian prerogatives to protect their own consumption levels, especially since they (ex 
hypothesi) do not cause the volcanic eruption. But now note that the prerogative-friendly option, 
Business as Usual, cannot be defended by increasing η within a Dasgupta-Koopmans V-function. 
For in both Business as Usual and Prevention, future generations’ consumption is lower than the 
current generation’s. This means the growth rate in consumption, g, is negative in both cases, 
and thus the consumption discount rate is also negative (assuming we’re forswearing pure time 
preference for the sake of argument). Just as a high positive η combined with a positive g enables 
us to sharply discount the consumption that accrues to better off future people, a high positive η 
combined with a negative g leads to sharply discounting our own consumption for the sake of 
consumption that will accrue to future people who are worse off than we are. So increasing η for 
prioritarian reasons would support choosing Prevention. The only plausible way to rank Business 
as Usual above Prevention—at least within a V-function—is to embrace pure DK discounting 
within the Dasgupta-Koopmans V-function. 
 I wish to stress that am not defending business as usual in the actual world, where the 
consumption of future generations is gravely threatened not by a natural disaster but by 
potentially catastrophic human-induced climate change. Nor am I even defending Business as 
Usual in the example above (though I do have the intuition that Business as Usual is morally 
permissible). The point is only that there are conceivable cases in which pure DK discounting is 
not necessarily ad hoc. Whether it is defensible in the real world depends crucially on what one 
wants to say about the larger question of climate change and intergenerational ethics. If it turns 
out that the current generation is morally entitled to assert even a weak Schefflerian prerogative 
when evaluating its climate change-related obligations, then at least some pure DK discounting 
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may be justified. Pace Broome and others (Asheim and Buchholz 2003; Dasgupta 2008: 157), 




My goal in this article has been to clarify the conceptual landscape against which the 
debate over pure time preference unfolds, and to begin to evaluate the arguments for and against 
pure time preference within the Dasgupta-Koopmans framework that many economists appear to 
adopt. My conclusion to this point is that we need further substantive discussions of 
intergenerational ethics to decide whether pure DK discounting should be a part of the current 
generation’s response to the situation it faces. At the very least, pure time preference is not the 
obvious ethical non-starter that most philosophers and many economists insist it is.  
 I want to close by noting that even if the current generation is justified in invoking 
Schefflerian prerogatives in its policy responses to future threats like climate change, there may 
still be strong reasons to jettison pure time preference from intertemporal welfare economics. 
Consider, for example, the following claims made by WG3: 
 
Justice is concerned with ensuring that people get what is due to them…Justice and rights 
are correlative concepts. On the other hand, criteria of value are concerned with 
improving the world: making it a better place. (Kolstad et. al. 2014: 215) 
 
What ethical considerations can economics cover satisfactorily? Since the methods of 
economics are concerned with value, they do not take account of justice and rights in 
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general…Economics is not well suited to taking into account many other aspects of 
justice, including compensatory justice. (Kolstad et. al. 2014: 215) 
 
There are two claims here. The first concerns what the “methods of economics are concerned 
with”; the second concerns what the methods of economics are “well suited” for. In its first 
claim, WG3 falsely implies that welfare economists never attempt to take account of justice and 
rights when they discuss η and ρ. As I have argued, that is precisely what Dasgupta, Cline, and 
Arrow are doing when they set values to η and ρ. However, I am more interested now in WG3’s 
second claim. Even if WG3 means only that the methods of welfare economics, in their current 
state of development, are “not well suited to taking into account many other aspects of justice,” 
that could still have profound implications for the issue of pure time preference. For if V-
functions should not be used to generate Dasgupta-Koopmans orderings*, then Dasgupta, Cline, 
Arrow, and Sen would be wrong to tailor η and ρ to reflect agent-relative considerations 
concerning intergenerational harming and Schefflerian prerogatives. Welfare economics would 
then be forced retreat into the role of providing goodness orderings only, which would leave 
economists only the options of pure time preference as applied to Goodness value (which I have 
granted is a morally problematic form of discrimination) and the more plausible form of 
discounting Goodness value that can be supported by egalitarian and/or prioritarian reasons and 
that is captured by η. Thus, depending on the ultimate limitations of intertemporal welfare 
economics, Broome might actually be right that η can capture all the reasons there are to 
discount future consumption in economic evaluations of climate change policy. But that will be 
so only if economists should radically restrict the use to which V-functions are put. If V-functions 
should be used to rank consumption streams solely in terms of their Goodness value, and not (as 
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is often the case) in terms of their DK value, then it would be true after all that the rate of pure 
time preference, ρ, should always be set to zero.26  
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